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Abstract
Are two parents and single parents allocating household resources to children in the
same way? Which factors affect intra-household inequality? Do mothers re-distribute more
income to children as they are more empowered? We focus on child welfare in the context
of two parent and single parent families, which is relevant for policy recommendation. We
model households behavior in a collective framework, which allows us to understand the
rule governing the allocation process between adults and children. Using consumption data
from Argentina from three consecutive expenditures surveys (1996, 2004 and 2012) we an-
alyze intra-household behavior over three different socio-economic contexts. We estimate a
collective quadratic demand system following a structural approach to identify the fraction
of total household expenditure that is devoted to children and adults, exploiting the ob-
servability of assignable goods. We provide the first evidence of intra-household inequality
and individual poverty levels for Argentina. Our results indicate that family structure mat-
ters in the intra-household distribution. We find a positive gender bias in expenditure when
children are females for both types of families, and we document that children fare better
when mothers have a higher bargaining power in the allocation process, measured by their
employment status. Further, we find several features of intra-household behavior which are
persistent in time.
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1 Introduction
There is a broad consensus that childhood is likely the most powerless and vulnerable com-
ponent of the family. Since the effects on their development during early ages are difficult
to reverse, the way in which resources are dedicated to them is a socially relevant concern.
The well-being of children critically depends on what happens inside the household. Family
resources are often not equally distributed between parents and children, because they have
different bargaining power, preferences and behavioral responses conditional on each specific
living situations.
Some family types are more vulnerable than others, and the proportion of household re-
sources that children receive may differ according to the family structure. This could be the case
of single parent households, which are disadvantaged in many areas, such as income, education,
health and career opportunities. The children of single parents are more likely to live in poverty,
and less likely to do well at school (Calder, 2018).
It is commonly accepted that mothers devote more resources to children than fathers. Could
be that it is not female headedness per se that is associated with child welfare, but the ab-
sence of a potential female decision maker within the household (Handa, 1994). Even though
women do not always have influence in the intra-household decision process, it is expected
that their bargaining power increases when they become income recipients because they have
different preferences over expenditures from men. There is evidence for developing countries
that an increment in the wife’s income relative to the husband’s is associated with an increase
in the budget share of food and a reduction of adult goods (Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995) or
an improvement in child health and nutrition (Thomas, 1990; Haddad and Hoddinott, 1994).
Further, in the context of program evaluation, sizeable cash transfers made to mothers are asso-
ciated with constant or higher shares of expenditure on food, probably explained by the increase
in the share of resources held by mothers (e.g. Schady and Rosero, 2008; Attanasio and Lechene,
2010; Armand et al., 2016; Tommasi, 2018).
Our objective is twofold. First, to identify the intra-household distribution of resources in
Argentina and to compare how two parent and, more fragile, single parent families assign their
resources to children, and investigate their determinants. Second, to understand the role that
working mothers play in the allocation process and to what extend they devote more economic
resources to children than fathers. To address this, we model households behavior in a collec-
tive framework, where individual preferences are taken into account and the resulting intra-
household allocation of resources is Pareto efficient (Chiappori, 1988, 1992). We use three con-
secutive household budget surveys (1996, 2004 and 2012) in order to compare intra-household
behavior and distribution of these two types of families over three different socio-economic con-
texts, and to evaluate what is the effect on child economic welfare when mothers contribute to
household income. We use a structural approach and estimate a collective quadratic demand
system following the methodology and identification strategy proposed by Chavas et al. (2014,
2018), and applied in Caiumi and Perali (2015), Menon et al. (2017) and Mangiavacchi et al.
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(2017). Our identification strategy relies on the observation of assignable goods. This enables
us to estimate the sharing rule that governs the intra-household distribution between adults and
children and, then, retrieve the total share and amount of the household’s resources devoted to
children and adults. We also illustrate the effects of accounting for intra-household inequality
on welfare measures, such us child poverty.
Argentina is particularly suitable for this analysis. On one hand, we can exploit the major
socio-economic fluctuations that households experienced over the last two decades by using
three budget surveys to compare intra-household inequality in two parent and single parent
families. During the 1990s, there was a process of economic liberalization, price stability and
increase of poverty and income inequality. After the 2001 devaluation and crisis, a process of
inflation began and households experienced a lower real incomes and expenditures. To cope
with the negative effects of the crisis and reduce poverty, the government implemented a robust
plan of social interventions. During the last years, the macroeconomic setting was more com-
plex, stressed by an upward trend in consumer prices and poverty rate. At the same time, wages
began to recover (Lustig et al., 2013). Single parents households are significantly vulnerable in
Argentina: 83% are female-headed, 70% are in the lowest two quintiles of the national income
distribution (INDEC, 2010), and they suffer more during macroeconomic crisis because they
are more likely to decrease consumption and have more difficulties accessing services (Gaviria,
2002). Given the specific situation and socio-economic characteristics of these families, UNICEF
(2017) has recommended to apply a segmentation in the implementation of welfare policies to
single parent households in order to reduce child poverty more effectively. Over the last decades
there has been a notable increase in the female labor participation in Argentina from 36.8% in
1990 to 48.1% in 2017 (Ministerio de Trabajo, 2017). This change is particularly remarkable
among mothers compared to women without children (UNDP, 2014).5 This allows us to explore
the effect of increasing women labor participation over intra-household distribution of resources
and child well-being.
Our results show that two parents and single parents assign their household resources to
children differently, and this allocation changes over time but in different directions according
to the family structure. On average, intra-household distribution in Argentina is pro-child, and
single parents devote a higher proportion but of a much lower household expenditure to children
than couples. We also identify characteristics of intra-household behavior that are persistent
in time. Additionally, we show direct evidence that when the mother works, in two parent
households, more resources (in relative and absolute terms) are allocated to children. We argue
that working mothers are able to favor their children. Female labor participation, and its increase
over time, reflect a strengthened bargaining position of the mother inside the household. This,
in turn, acts as a channel that allows working mothers to devote more economic resources to
their children in comparison to households with non-working mothers. We also find systematic
evidence, and robust over time, of a pro-female gender bias in child expenditure.
5Martinoty (2015) shows that the added worker effect played an important role in coping against aggregate
shocks during the 2001 economic crisis.
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Our contributions are several. First, the majority of applications of the collective household
theory have focused on the bargaining process, and estimation of the sharing rule, between
spouses. We contribute to the scarce but still growing evidence on how household resources
are shared between adults and children, identifying the level of resource shares (Dunbar et al.,
2013; Bargain et al., 2014; Mangiavacchi et al., 2017; Bargain et al., 2017; Bargain et al., 2018).
Further, we analyze the sharing rule over very distinct periods of time, distinguishing which
behaviors did change and which still persist. Second, there is extremely scarce evidence of how
resources are distributed within households for Latin American countries (Iglesias and Coelho,
2018),6 even though inequality is still a distinctive and pervasive characteristic of the region with
a non-stable trajectory over time (Gasparini et al., 2009). In this sense, knowledge about intra-
household inequality may contribute to the understanding of its level, tendency as well as the
mechanisms behind its evolution. Even more, many of these countries typically share some other
common characteristic, such us the increase in female labor participation during the last decade
and its deceleration during the last years (Gasparini and Marchionni, 2015). Our results could
be a starting point to analyze the general situation of these societies and their welfare policies
towards mothers and children. Third, the inclusion of single parent households is highly relevant
for policy recommendations. However, in the literature there is a paucity of empirical work on
the extent and nature of resource sharing in households with just one parent. We provide
evidence of it and exploit the comparison of the intra-household distributive behavior of these
two types of families during different economic and social contexts. Bargain et al. (2014) find
that children in single mother families receive a slightly larger share of the household resources
than in two-parent families, but they cannot conclude that mothers are more altruistic towards
children than fathers. We also provide robust evidence over time that children fare better when
mothers have more influence over family resources. Unlike the evidence previously mentioned,
we associate a higher bargaining power of the mother in the allocation process (measured by
their working status) to a direct increase in the proportion of economic resources that children
receive. We explicitly contribute to the evidence showing that there is an the improvement of
child well-being due to women empowerment through labor participation, measuring a labor
market effect on the sharing rule.
Relevant policy implications may be drawn from this analysis. Understanding the process of
household allocation is important for both policy design and program evaluation.7 Our evidence
may suggest that those cash transfers aimed to reduce poverty among children could be more
effective if targeted towards women. These types of programs have increased in Latin American
countries during the last decade. Moreover, not only the identity and gender of the recipient
is likely to have welfare effects (Duflo, 2000; 2003; Yoong et al., 2012, Armand et al., 2016;
Tommasi, 2018) but also the response of non recipients, since the impact of public transfers is
conditional upon the behavior inside the household. It seems crucial to be able to anticipate their
6Other studies have analyzed different features of intra-household behavior (Inchauste, 2001; Thomas, 1990,
1994; Emerson and Souza, 2007), but without identifying the proportion of household resources devoted to children.
7In general, the literature interested in assessing the differences in the way fathers and mothers allocate resources
in developing countries is related to the literature on cash transfer programs.
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responses when such policies are focused on improving child welfare. Additionally, the effect
that an increase in female labor participation may have over the distribution of resources inside
the households and the well-being of children is non trivial in terms of policy interventions. It
is also relevant to account for the family structure when developing a social policies, since there
are important differences in their characteristics and their intra-household behavior. Finally,
intra-household inequality should be considered when measuring child poverty and evaluating
the impact of those public policies specifically designed to reduce it.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the general conceptual
framework of collective models, some related literature and our structural model. Section 3
presents the specification of the sharing rule and the demand system. Section 4 outlines Argen-
tinean data and the estimation strategy. Section 5 presents and discusses results, and in Section
6 final remarks and policy implications are drawn.
2 Collective Framework
Traditional models of consumption assume that the household acts as one entity. The household
is a single decision unit characterized by a single utility function that is maximized under a
budget constraint with pooled resources. Alderman et al. (1995) label such models as the
"unitary" approach.8 In the unitary model of the household, resources are equally distributed
among members according to their needs, so that all members are assumed to have the same
level of welfare. Thus, resource allocation processes is omitted by construction.
However, there is consensus that decisions should be modeled at the individual level, and
that household behavior should be analyzed in terms of the interactions among its members. The
unitary framework has been extended by the seminal works of Chiappori (1988, 1992), whom
introduced a theoretical household model, the collective model, that explicitly recognizes the
existence of several decision-making units in the family, with potentially different preferences.9
Under this framework, households are characterized as a collection of individuals, each of whom
has a well defined objective function and who interact to generate household level decisions.
Decisions are assumed to be Pareto efficient allocations, in the sense that, for a given choice, it is
not possible to increase one member’s welfare without reducing that of the others - if individual
utility functions are well-behaved and the budget sets are convex. Pareto-efficiency implies
that the consumption equilibrium will be on the Pareto frontier of the family. The rationale of
this assumption is that efficient allocations are likely to emerge when agents are able to make
binding commitments and have full information, as it is reasonably the case of a household
setting.
Collective models are based mainly on the sharing rule, that is, a function describing in-
teractions between household members and the decision making process regarding the intra-
8These models are also referred to as the "common preferences" model, the "altruism" model, or the "benevolent
dictator" model, referring to different hypothesis of why the household is considered to act as one entity.
9Donni and Chiappori (2011), Chiappori and Mazzocco (2017), and Donni and Molina (2018) provide the most
recent reviews of the theoretical and empirical advances in this literature.
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household distribution of resources. The sharing rule depends on exogenous variables that
affect the bargaining power of family members in allocation decisions but without affecting
individual preferences. These variables are called in the literature distribution factors.
Browning et al. (1994) implemented Chiappori’s collective model in a consumption frame-
work with expenditure data, opening up the possibility of making welfare comparisons at the
individual level, rather than at the household level. Bourguignon (1999) later established how
to derive the sharing rule between parents and children, arguing that children have bargain-
ing power. In this way, children are not longer considered public goods for parents, but agents
with their own preferences, utility and, hence, welfare. This allows to capture the child–adult
bargaining process that exists within the household.
We model the sharing rule governing the intra-household allocation of consumption expen-
ditures between adults and children, following the structural approach proposed by Chavas et
al. (2014, 2018), and applied in Caiumi and Perali (2015), Menon et al. (2017) and Man-
giavacchi et al. (2017). In our set up, households are comprised of two different members
of type k: adults a, and children c. We assume that the two member-type purchase N non-
assignable private goods x = (x1, ..., xN ), and n assignable private goods xk = (xk1, ..., x
k
n).
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Private goods can be assigned to a specific family member (adults or children), while for non-
assignable goods one can observe only consumption at the household level.11 The associated
vectors of market prices for assignable and non-assignable goods are pxk = (pxk1 , ..., pxkn), and
px = (px1 , ..., pxN ), respectively. Market prices of non-assignable goods are observed at the
household level. Observed heterogeneity is captured by a set of demographic characteristics
d = da, dc, dh comprising the vector dk = (dk1 , ..., dkR) specific to each type of member k, with
R elements and the vector of household characteristics common to the family dh = (dh1 , ..., dhH )
with H elements. The family faces a linear and convex budget constraint.12
Given the results provided in Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Browning and Chiappori (1998),
the collective model is formally equivalent to a model of family income sharing in which the
decision-making process can be decentralized into two stages. In the first stage, household
members decide how to share household total expenditure (or income) y, by assigning to each
type k a given amount φk of the household resources. Thus, the sum of these individual re-
sources is equal to total household expenditure, y = φa + φc, where φk represents the shadow
individual incomes for each member-type. In a consumption model it must be greater than zero,
since it represents a expenditure. In the second stage, each member-type chooses its own opti-
mal consumption bundle maximizing its utility function given its budget constraint. Formally, in
the primal representation of the decentralized program,
10Superscript k = a, c is associated with endogenous variables and subscript k = a, c with exogenous variables.
11A good is non-assignable when a private good is consumed without rivalry in unobserved proportions by all
or some non identifiable household members (e.g. food). Conversely, a good is assignable when a private good
is consumed by only one identifiable member and its price is different from the price of the other exclusive goods
consumed within the family (e.g. clothing for adults and children).
12The proposed model assumes that there are no externalities within families and abstracts from the consumption
of domestically produced goods.
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max
x,xk
{uk(x,xk;da,dc,dh) : p′xx + p
′
xkx
k = φk} for k = a, c (1)
The solution of this problem yields the following individual Marshallian demand functions xˆk =
xk(px,pxk ,φk,d) and xˆ = x(px,pxk , φk,d) where optimal consumption of the non-assignable
good is observed at the household level as a function of the sharing rule, prices and demographic
attributes.
In the next section, we specify the identification strategy for the sharing rule and derive the
collective quadratic demand system used in the empirical application.
3 Identification Strategy
3.1 Specification of the Sharing Rule
Our objective is to econometrically identify the unobservable sharing rule φk - the shadow expen-
diture that each member-type of the household receives. The challenge is how to use available
information on observed expenditures consumed at the individual level. When exploited prop-
erly, this information is a sufficient condition to identify how economic resources are shared
within the household. In particular, the minimal information required for identification of the
resource share13 is the observability of at least one assignable good, or two exclusive goods
(Browning et al., 1994; Bourguignon, 1999).
Our source of identification relies on the observation of consumption of assignable goods
across family members that, if income is fixed, must be associated with a redistributive transfer
of resources within the household. For example, the presence of a child induces a redistribution
of consumption within the household (Rothbarth 1941, 1943). If income remains unchanged
before and after a child arrival, the associated new demand for children goods is met by reducing
the expenses on adult goods and, to a less extent, on all other goods. Our empirical identification
strategy intends to capture these income reallocation effects.14 The end result is that we identify
how total household expenditures on all goods are divided up among household members.
The identifying assumption is that we can recover a partially observable individual expendi-
ture (ya, yc) exploiting the information on exclusive or assignable goods (xa, xc). Those goods,
which are neither exclusive nor assignable, are assumed to be equally distributed between the
types of members, so that the non-assignable expenditure of each member type is equal to
0.5x.15 Under this procedure we construct the best possible approximation of total observable
individual expenditures using the available information, given by
13The terms sharing rule and resource share are used interchangeably, indicating the proportion of household
expenditure consumed by the adults and the children.
14Exclusive goods for children may produce economies of scales if, for example, the same clothes are used by more
than one child. In that case, the sharing of children’s clothes probably mitigates the income reallocation effect.
15Chavas et al. (2014) show that the assumption of fair division of the non-assignable expenditures between
household members is neutral since it does not affect the identification of the sharing rule parameters.
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yk = p
′
xkx
k + p
′
x0.5x for k = a, c (2)
Let us define sk = yk/y with
∑
k sk = 1 so that y = sa y + sc y.
The econometric strategy is built from an analogy of the technique used to include demo-
graphic variables or exogenous variables into demand functions (Pollak and Wales, 1981; Lew-
bel, 1985). In our case, the partially observable individual expenditure, yk, is modified by an
income scaling function Mk(ψ) a la Barten (Barten, 1964), where ψ is a vector including the
distribution factors and the relative price of assignable goods16
φk(y, ψ) = yk ∗Mk(ψ) for k = a, c (3)
The modifying scaling function Mk(ψ) can be interpreted as a correction factor. Given that
individual expenditures are known with measurement error because of the limited information
about assignable goods, we correct this imprecision by scaling the partially observed individual
expenditure yk with a latent linear function Mk(ψ) depending on background exogenous vari-
ables that predict the unobserved income transfer.17 Mk(ψ) is a function describing the transfer
between adults and children in the households, with 0 < Mk(ψ) < y/yk. It explains both the
amount and direction of the allocation of resources to household members. If Mk(ψ) < 1, then,
adults reallocate expenditure towards children.
As shown in equation (3), and noted before, the sharing rule is constructed and defined as a
function of observational data: expenditures in assignable goods, prices of assignable goods and
exogenous variables explaining the intra-household allocation process (distribution factors).
Since by definition ln φa(.) + ln φc(.) = ln y holds, the logarithm of the intra-household
transfer from adults to children must be the same. That is, the following constraint on lnMk
must hold:
lnMa(ψ) = −lnMc(ψ) (4)
This allows us to set,
lnMa(ψ) = lnM(ψ) and sa = s (5)
In this way we are able to estimate the same scaling function Mk(ψ) for both member-types
and identify both individual scaling functions by changing its sign.
16We do not scale total expenditure at the household level because it would capture demographical differences
across households and would not identify the allocation decision process between family members, since total house-
hold expenditures provide no information about the distribution of resources within the household.
17The estimation challenge is similar to that of estimating a regression containing unobservable independent vari-
ables (Goldberger, 1972). However, since our objective is to estimate the unobservable sharing rule φk which
represents the best estimate of the unobserved individual income, we have both an unobserved independent and
dependent variable.
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3.2 Collective Quadratic Demand System
The chosen demand system is the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS), an exten-
sion of the originally linear in income AIDS system (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980) proposed
by Banks et al. (1997).18 The model is extended in two ways. First, we incorporate household
demographic characteristics interacting with income in a theoretically plausible way (Pollak and
Wales, 1981). Second, we incorporate our proxy of individual incomes (Equation (3)) for the
two type of members of the household, introducing the sharing rule and allowing us to estimate
a collective model (Chavas et al., 2018).
The budget share specification of the QUAIDS for good i is
wi(y, p) = αi +
∑
j
γji ln pj + βi(ln y − ln a(p)) + λi
b(p)
(ln y − ln a(p))2 (6)
where wi(y, p) is the good i budget share, αi, γij , λij are parameters, pj is the price of good
j and y is total household expenditure. a(p) and b(p) are prices indexes defined as
ln a(p) = α0 +
∑
i αiln pi +
1
2
∑
i
∑
j γji ln piln pj
ln b(p) =
∑
i βiln pi, or b(p) =
∏
i p
βi
i
First, the quadratic system is extended in order to incorporate socio-demographic observed
heterogeneity across households, since these variables are major determinants of household
consumption patterns. Budget shares are demographically modified according to the translating
technique,
wi(y, p) = wi(y, p, ti(d))
where ti(d) is an income translating function and d is a vector of demographic variables or
household characteristics. This demographic specification models household characteristics as
if they were fixed costs deflating income (i.e. translating the budget line).
Applying this linear demographic translating transformation to equation (6), the demo-
graphic modified budget share equation is obtained19
wi(y, p, d) = αi + ti(d) +
∑
j
γji ln pj + βi(ln y
∗ − ln a(p)) + λi
b(p)
(ln y∗ − ln a(p))2 (7)
where
ti(d) =
∑
ir ln dr
18There is enough evidence indicating that the quadratic functional form is an adequate fit for Argentinean data
(Pizzolitto, 2007; Pace Guerrero, 2013; Echeverría and Berges, 2015).
19The asterisk denotes that the variable is demographically modified.
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ln y∗ = ln y −∑i ti(d) ln pi
Secondly, the system is extended to the collective case introducing the sharing rule, which
determines (the natural logarithm of) the amount of resources that each member-type of the
household receives. Thus, the following equation shows the budget share equation for good i
according to the specification of the collective quadratic almost ideal demand system,
wi(y, d, p, ψ) = αi + ti(d) +
∑
j
γji ln pj + β
a
i (ln φ
∗
a − ln a(p)) +
λai
ba(p)
(ln φ∗a − ln a(p))2+
βci (ln φ
∗
c − ln a(p)) +
λci
bc(p)
(ln φ∗c − ln a(p))2
(8)
where ln φ∗a and ln φ∗c are member-type (total) individual expenditures modified by a trans-
lating household technology, defined as
ln φ∗a = ln φa(y, ψ)−
∑
i
ti(d) ln pi
ln φ∗c = ln φc(y, ψ)−
∑
i
ti(d) ln pi
(9)
The demographically scaled sharing rules in (9) can be re-write as
ln φ∗a = ln ya + lnMa(ψ)−
∑
i ti(d) ln pi = s ln y + lnM(ψ)−
∑
i ti(d) ln pi
ln φ∗c = ln yc + lnMc(ψ)−
∑
i ti(d) ln pi = (1− s) ln y − lnM(ψ)−
∑
i ti(d) ln pi
The empirical specification ofM(ψ) is a Cobb-Douglas function, so that the logarithmic spec-
ification is linear in the parameters,
lnM(ψ) = φpr ln pr +
∑
l φl ln zl
where l = 1, ..., L is the dimension of the vector of distribution factors z, and pr is the
relative price of the assignable goods. In an analogy to ti(d) function, M(ψ) is identified if
there is sufficient variation in the price of assignable goods and distribution factors.
In order to comply with homogeneity properties of the demand system (adding-up, linear
homogeneity in p, and the Slutsky symmetry), the budget shares must hold under a number of
restrictions on the parameters20
20The last restriction on the demographic parameters ensures that the modified cost function maintains the homo-
geneity property (Perali, 2003).
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∑
i
αi = 1;
∑
i
βi = 0;
∑
i
λi = 0;
∑
i
γij = 0;
∑
j
γij = 0; γij = γji;
∑
i
τir = 0
(10)
The use of distribution factors incorporates an additional restriction, which is that distribu-
tion factors must differ from the demographic variables, in order for the parameters of lnM(ψ)
and ti(d) to be identified.
The estimation allows to identify individual income parameters βai , β
c
i , λ
a
i , λ
c
i but the inter-
cept αi, price parameters γij and the parameters of the scaling functions ti(d) and lnM(ψ) are
estimated at the household level.21 φl are the main parameters of interest.
4 Empirical Strategy
In this section we describe the data used and the econometric approach employed in the empir-
ical application of the collective demand system.
4.1 Data
Household data comes from the National Household Expenditure Survey (ENGH) conducted
by the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC) of Argentina. The first survey was
implemented in 1996-97, the second during 2004-05 and the last one during 2012-13. The
surveys are nationally representative and aimed at households located in areas of 5,000 or more
inhabitants. In 1996, the survey covered a total of 27,245 households, in 2004 29,111, and
in 2012 20,954. The ENGH provides very comprehensive data on household expenditures and
quantities for a broad set of consumption categories and with a very high disaggregation level.
Expenditure data is collected using recall methods based on the nature of purchased items. Daily
expenditures, such as food and beverages, household cleaning products, medication, expenses
for personal care, have a recall period of seven days prior to the interview. For semi-durables,
as clothing, education and health services, the recall period is the month prior to the interview,
and for durables and holiday expenditure the last prior six months. All expenditures are already
converted into monthly consumption. The data also records detailed information on housing
conditions as well as individual data on socio-demographic characteristics and labor status.
In order to recover the underlying structure of the collective model, we use the available
information about private assignable consumption. For adults, we exploit data on clothing and
footwear, alcoholic beverages, casino games, newspapers, cigarettes, jewelry and hairdressing,
while for children we use the expenditure information of clothing and footwear, games and toys,
children’s books, education, children’s backpacks, daycare centers, diapers, ready-prepared baby
21The individual demand equations are summed up to form the household demand equation. Some individual
parameters cannot be identified either because of collinearity (two constrains in the same equation cannot be iden-
tified) or data construction (since some information, as prices and demographic characteristics, are recorded at the
household level).
11
food and hairdressing. Clothing and footwear are the largest components and, on average, they
account for 75% of the total assignable expenditures.
We select two sub-samples of households composed of two parents and a single parent with
children. On average, surveyed families have 2 children. We exclude households with more
than 3 children (between 3.6% and 8.2%, according to the year and sub-sample).22 For 1996
and 2004 (2012) surveys, we exclude households with children older than 10 (14) years of age,
since assignable information of clothing is asked for members below and above this age.
We define six categories of expenditures: food and beverages, clothing and footwear, housing
and maintenance, transport and communications, recreation and education, and health and
others. To account for outliers, we eliminate families with expenditures higher than 8 standard
deviations from the mean of each aggregated category (1.5% excluded households). We include
a set of demographic variables to account for observable heterogeneity across households. We
use regional dummies for the Great Buenos Aires, Center, North and South Argentina, and
variables of the economic status of the household: indicators for ownership of at least one car,
house ownership, and if the household is able to save money. We also specify a set of dummies
for health insurance, education level (low, medium, and high)23 and age groups (18 to 34, and
35 to 64) of the household head. In the case of the two parents sub-sample, these dummies are
also constructed for the spouse.
The exogenous variables chosen for the specification of the sharing rule are information
associated with characteristics of the children and the parents that likely affect the bargaining
power and the allocation of resources between adults and children. It is not possible to test
directly whether a variable is a valid distribution factor, however the choice of the variables
can be supported by the prevailing literature and previous evidence. Our distribution factors
are the following. First, an indicator variable if at least one child is aged above 7. We include
this variable to account for the fact that more grown-up children may participate, to some
degree, in the resource allocation process. Dauphin et al. (2011) find evidence that adolescents
influence the household decision-making process. In an experiment, Harbaugh et al. (2003)
show that children have good bargaining skills since earlier ages. Second, an indicator variable
if children are females. Evidence for gender discrimination in the collective framework is both
diverse and country-specific. For example, Dunbar et al. (2013) document some evidence of
gender discrimination against girls in Malawi: if all children are girls, then the mother’s resource
share rises, and the children’s share falls. Bargain et al. (2018) find pro-boy discrimination for
Bangladesh, meanwhile Bargain et al. (2014) find no robust and compelling evidence of gender
preference in the allocation of household resources to children for Côte d’Ivoire and neither
Bargain et al. (2017) for South Africa. For Albanian households Mangiavacchi et al. (2017)
show that a higher proportion of girls in the household improves their sharing rule. Third,
the price ratio of clothing, defined as adults’ over children’s clothing price, in order to capture
how the relative price of assignable goods influence the amount of resources that adults and
22This is also done in previous works as in Bargain et al. (2014).
23We define the categories low education level as elementary education or less, medium as secondary completed
or not, and high as university completed or not.
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children receive. For the sample of two-parent households, we also add education difference
of the parents (years of schooling of the father minus years of schooling of the mother) and
age difference of the parents (age of the father minus age of the mother). The age and level
of education of the husband and wife affect the bargaining power between adults (e.g. Bargain
et al., 2014; Mangiavacchi et al., 2017; Menon et al., 2017). Moreover, there is evidence that
this translate into a higher resource share for children (Dunbar et al., 2013). The inclusion
of these variables is mainly based on the assumption that mothers may be more in favor of
children than husbands. In this sense, it is possible that these two distribution factors reflect
the differences in parents "attitudes" towards children. Fifth, we control for whether the mother
is employed. It allows us to indirectly include labor information that may modify the way in
which expenditures are distributed within the household, in line with mentioned literature that
indicates that, when possible, mothers tend to favor their children. When providing additional
income to the family, the mother may have more bargaining power as well as more influence on
the intra-household decision process. For example, Bargain et al. (2017) document for South
Africa that mother’s employment status translates into a higher share of resources allocated to
children. As mentioned before, this could be particularly relevant in the context of Argentina,
where there has been major changes over the last decades in the labor market and the female
participation.24
In the case of single parent households, the last three distribution factors are not considered.
Table A.1 and A.2 of Appendix A contains some descriptive statistics for the relevant variables.
Throughout our analysis we use weighted observation in order to correct any bias introduced
by the sampling design, so that inference is made with respect to the underlying population of
interest.
Finally, the estimation of demand systems requires the consideration of many empirical is-
sues, such as the construction of prices, the correction for infrequency of purchases, the cor-
rection of assignable information and dealing with potential endogeneity of total expenditure.
Data preparation is discussed in more detail in Appendix B.
4.2 Final Specification of the Empirical Model
The collective QUAIDS model specified in (8) is modified as to introduce the empirical issues
mentioned above (see Appendix B). The vector of parameters τi of the zero expenditure cor-
rection is estimated using a Maximum Likelihood Probit estimator to recover the predicted cu-
mulative and probability density functions Ψˆ(s′iτˆi) and ψˆ(s
′
iτˆi). The predicted residuals ωˆ of
the endogenous regressor (total expenditure) are obtained by OLS estimation of the endoge-
nous variable on all covariates and the instruments. Prices pˆ are the household-specific pseudo
unit values previously computed. Finally, the system estimates are obtained by Full Information
Maximum Likelihood of the demand system in budget share form,
24We recognize that the inclusion of labor choices in the sharing rule may be a source of endogeneity.
13
wi = Ψˆi[αi + ti(d) +
∑
j
γji ln pˆj + β
a
i (ln φ
∗
a − ln a(pˆ)) +
λai
ba(pˆ)
(ln φ∗a − ln a(pˆ))2+
βci (ln φ
∗
c − ln a(pˆ)) +
λci
bc(pˆ)
(ln φ∗c − ln a(pˆ))2] + ηiψˆi + ςiωˆ + εi
(11)
where a spheric error term εi has been added. The system is estimated imposing the condi-
tions specified in (10), and dropping the equation of health and other goods.
5 Results
Table 1 shows the parameters associated with the distribution factors for each sub-sample, cou-
ples with children and single parents with children. The parameters of the sharing rule are
estimated jointly with the demand system, but are reported separately since they are the focus
of our work. Tables A.8, A.9 and A.10 of Appendix A present all the estimates of the demand
system. The coefficients associated with the residuals of the first stage of the control function
are, in general, statistically significant, indicating that total expenditure is endogenous.
Table 1: Adults’ Sharing Rule Function Parameters
distribution factors 1996 2004 2012
Two Parent Families
1 if at least 1 child is >7 -0.068 (0.083) -0.065 (0.074) 0.140 (0.094)
1 if children are females -0.299*** (0.112) -0.215** (0.082) -0.424*** (0.092)
price ratio of clothing -0.017** (0.007) -0.004 (0.009) -0.018 (0.011)
age father - age mother -0.014 (0.009) 0.019* (0.009) -0.029*** (0.008)
educ father - educ mother 0.005 (0.019) -0.017 (0.012) 0.010 (0.012)
1 if the mother is employed -0.079 (0.124) -0.125** (0.061) -0.224** (0.088)
Number of obs. 3,783 3,633 3,862
Number of weighted obs. 1,031,705 1,479,933 2,043,241
Single Parent Families
1 if at least 1 child is >7 0.217 (0.166) 0.015 (0.073) 0.092 (0.092)
1 if children are females -0.148 (0.093) -0.199** (0.079) -0.660*** (0.093)
price ratio of clothing 0.004 (0.011) -0.003 (0.009) -0.001 (0.007)
Number of obs. 304 414 693
Number of weighted obs. 84,632 145,806 311,135
Note: These are the parameters of the sharing rule function. They are estimated jointly with the collective QUAIDS demand system
specified in Equation (11). All the rest of the system parameters are reported in Tables A.8, A.9 and A.10 of Appendix A. The system
estimation is done separately for each type of family and each survey. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Our estimations show that the presence of an older child does not affect the sharing rule
of adults in neither of both family structures (Table 1). We find robust evidence of gender
preference in expenditure over time and for both family types, that holds on a systematic basis,
when all kids in the household are females. Thus, there is an unequal treatment regarding
allocation of expenditure; adults are diverting more resources to children when there are not
male children in the household. The adults’ sharing rule is negatively influenced by the price of
adults clothing only for couples with children in 1996; when this price increases (or the price
of clothing for children is relatively lower) they allocate more resources to children. For two
parent families the difference in education of the parents25 does not have a significant effect on
the intra-household allocation process in any period.26 For 2004 and 2012, the age difference of
the parents significantly influences the distribution of resources within the household. However,
the direction of the effect changes. For 2004, a decrease in the age gap of the parents decreases
the resource share of the adults, while in 2012 it increases.27 Finally, there is evidence that
mother employment status significantly affects the intra-household allocation of resources. If
the mother earns labor income the expenditure allocated to adults decreases and, consequently,
the resource share of children rises. The magnitude of the effect is larger over time.
5.1 Intra-Household Inequality and Family Structure
Table 2 shows the predicted sharing rule, as proportion of household expenditure consumed by
the adults and the children in each type of family and period of time. In the case of two parent
families, in 1996 the intra-household distribution of resources was pro-child. On average, each
child received 36% of household expenditures and each adult 21%.28 In 2004, in a post-crisis
context of lower standard of living and lower real income and expenditure, the distribution of
resources became more equal (Figure 1). In contrast, for 2012 the intra-household distribu-
tion returned to its pre-crisis values, leaving children in a better relative position - in terms of
individual welfare.
For single parent families, the resource shows a different behavior and dynamic through
time. The share of total expenditure that each child receives in single parent households in-
creased from 39% in 1996 to 44% in 2004, and 47% in 2012. In this case, children’s sharing
rule increased on average, even during the period of major economic adjustments and lagged
real wages. We find an overall improvement in children welfare of 8 percentage points on av-
erage over the last two decades, compared to the 4 percentage points increase in families with
25The sign and significance of the parameters of the education and age difference variables are robust to different
specifications, such as defining the ratio between husband’s age and wife’s age, and husband’s education and wife’s
education.
26The latter result is in line with evidence for Argentina showing that the relatively high and constant degree of
assortative mating during the last decades has not had an impact over income labor inequality (Funes Leal, 2015).
27We find that changes in the age difference may relate to intra-household distributional issues. In 2012, parents
are older and the age difference between them is smaller than in 2004. The age gap is negatively correlated with
income, but less variable through income quintiles in 2012.
28The per child (per adult) sharing rule is obtained by dividing the estimated children’s (adult’s) sharing rule by
the number of children (adults) in the household. We assume that within children and adults groups there is an
equal distribution of resources. By analyzing in per capita terms we control for family size.
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two parents. The direction of these observed changes hold for all family sizes, however they are
more pronounced in families with one child, where there is probably more margin to modify the
intra-household distribution.
In the case of two parent households, the sharing rule for children living in one child family
decreases in 14% from 1996 to 2004, but it is higher in the post crisis period than it was before.
In contrast, in households with 2 and 3 children, their share of total expenditure is practically
the same in 2012 than in 1996. In the case of single parent households, the increase in children’s
resource share from 1996 to 2012 is higher in families with just one child.29
Table 2: Predicted Sharing Rule (resource share)
1996 2004 2012
predicted Two Parents Single Parents Two Parents Single Parents Two Parents Single Parents
sharing rule Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
adults 0.43 0.10 0.45 0.12 0.50 0.12 0.40 0.09 0.40 0.13 0.36 0.12
children 0.57 0.10 0.55 0.12 0.50 0.12 0.60 0.09 0.60 0.13 0.64 0.12
per adult 0.21 0.05 0.45 0.12 0.25 0.06 0.40 0.09 0.20 0.06 0.36 0.12
per child 0.36 0.14 0.39 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.44 0.13 0.40 0.17 0.47 0.18
families with 1 child
adults 0.50 0.10 0.52 0.09 0.57 0.11 0.45 0.05 0.43 0.14 0.39 0.13
child 0.50 0.10 0.48 0.09 0.43 0.11 0.55 0.05 0.57 0.14 0.61 0.13
families with 2 children
adults 0.41 0.07 0.39 0.09 0.46 0.09 0.35 0.07 0.39 0.11 0.34 0.08
children 0.59 0.07 0.61 0.09 0.54 0.09 0.65 0.07 0.61 0.11 0.66 0.08
families with 3 children
adults 0.34 0.06 0.35 0.08 0.40 0.08 0.27 0.05 0.35 0.10 0.29 0.06
children 0.66 0.06 0.65 0.08 0.60 0.08 0.73 0.05 0.65 0.10 0.71 0.06
For all years and both family structures, the average resource share for adults decreases
with the number of children. When family size increases, adults devote more resources to their
children, but not proportionally. This may be related to the fact that there is some degree of
inelasticity in adults expenditures and, that despite the increasing number of children, there is a
limit for the amount of resources that parents are willing to give up. Besides, there is probably
some sharing when there are more children in the household, for example toys or clothing. For
both types of family, in 2012 (in a more relax income context) the allocation of resources is less
dependent on the number of children.
29Our main interest is not to focus on how the sharing rule and intra-household resources have changed over time
given that we only use three rounds of the expenditure survey and that we do not consider a dynamic approach.
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When comparing the two family types in each period of time, we observe a different behavior
resulting on a different intra-household per capita distribution. For all years, the distribution
inside two parent families was on average pro-child regardless of the family size. However,
in 2004, where the economic context was more difficult, the intra-household allocation was
relatively more equal in families with 2 or 3 children. On the other hand, in single parent
households the allocation of total expenditure was pro-adult in 1996, and pro-child only in
families with one child in 2004 and 2012.
Interestingly, children’s resource share is relatively the same between the two types of fami-
lies in 1996, but higher in single parent families (and for all family sizes) in 2004 and 2012. In
particular, differences are more pronounced in 2004, after the crisis and in a context of lower
real expenditure, where children in single parent families get around 12 pp. more of household
resources. Thus, in families where there is a sole decision maker, children are better off in terms
of individual welfare. At the same time, single adults seem to be doing better than adults in a
couples in relative terms. However, this is not true in absolute terms, since single parent families
are poorer. The average amount of expenditure in pesos30 that each child receives in two parent
families is 42%, 23% and 16% higher, in each period of time, respectively. Thus, single parents
are allocating a higher proportion, but of a much lower household expenditure, to children than
couples. Since single parent families live in a more restrictive economic situation and are more
vulnerable than two parent households, they are probably just meeting their children most basic
needs. In fact, for families in the first quintile of the national income distribution, the level of
expenditure in pesos that parents allocate to children is almost the same in both types of fam-
ilies. However, the relevant disparity is that approximately 45% of single parents households
are in the first quintile, compare to the 15% of two parent households. It is interesting to note
that if single parents were to have a higher income and reverse their poverty situation, children
could be specially better off and improve their well-being since their sharing rule is higher than
in two parent families.
Figure 1 depicts the behavior of the estimated sharing rule for the two family type across
income. In general, the sharing rule is not highly variant in total expenditure. On average, rich
and poor families have a similar resource share. However, there are some differences across
family types. For two parent families, we find, for all periods, that the divergence between the
share of total expenditure allocated to children and adults is larger for households with higher
total expenditure. For single parent families, a more diverse behavior and pattern across income
is observed; the gap decreases with income in 1996, is reverse for low income levels in 2004,
and is constant in 2012.
30Argentinean currency.
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Figure 1: Per Capita Sharing Rule - Two Parent Families (left) and Single Parent Families (right)
Note: expenditures are expressed in current pesos of each period.
The sharing rule is not the same across households. There are heterogeneities driven by the
characteristics of the family members or the family situation.31 The per child sharing rule is
higher when parents have a high education level in comparison to parents with low education
level, regardless of income. For two parent families, the difference on average is 4 p.p. in 1996,
and increases to 8 p.p. in 2004 and 2012. For single parent families, 6 p.p. in 1996, 8 p.p.
31Even tough Argentina presents large socio-economic and cultural disparities across regions, on average there are
not significant differences in the estimated sharing rule for households living in different geographic locations.
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in 2004, and decreases to 1 p.p. in 2012. The age of the parents also modifies the average
proportion of total household economic resources that children receive, but the effect is not
homogeneous. In two parent families, the per child sharing rule is higher when parents are
older, between 50 and 64 years old (but in 2004 it is lower in families with high income levels).
In contrast, there are not significant differences in the children’s sharing rule according to the
parents age in single parent families for any period.
Accounting for intra-household distribution of resources has implications on individual wel-
fare. Traditional measures of welfare, such as poverty and inequality, assume equal distribution
of resources among family members, considering the distribution of income (or expenditure)
across households but not across individuals. These measures, usually based on per capita
terms, are at least incomplete and often misleading (Chiappori and Meghir, 2015). Table 3
compares child poverty and inequality indicators (at the household level) for the most recent
period (2012) under two different methods: a) the traditional “indirect” method, and b) the
refined “direct” method. That is, the Gini index and poverty headcount FGT are calculated
over two person-level expenditures: one that assumes an equal distribution of resources within
the family (per capita) and a more refined measure that accounts for intra-household inequal-
ity (sharing rule). The indirect method for computing poverty captures the proportion of poor
households with children, while the direct method captures the proportion of households with
poor children independently of the poverty status of the parents. To define the poverty, we use
both a relative threshold (half of the median of each person-level expenditure), and an absolute
poverty line (US$4/person/day32) adjusted by the intra-household income transfer to children,
in the case of the direct method.
Table 3: Child Poverty and Inequality Indicators (2012)
Indicators Two Parent Families Single Parent Families
Inequality: Gini
Indirect Method: Per capita expenditure 0.36 0.40
Direct Method: Per child sharing rule 0.43 0.43
Poverty: FGT - (A)
Indirect Method: Per capita expenditure 14.5% 13.1%
Direct Method: Per child sharing rule 15.2% 17.1%
Poverty: FGT - (B)
Indirect Method: Per capita expenditure 16.1% 17.4%
Direct Method: Per child sharing rule 19.4% 19.5%
We illustrate how accounting for intra-household distribution of resource modifies child wel-
fare measures. Considering intra-household distribution of resources adds an additional source
of inequality, accounting for both inequality across households and within households. Inequal-
ity measures based on collective results are higher compare to those based on an unitary set-
32This line is approximately similar to the median value of official poverty lines in Latin American countries (CED-
LAS, 2015).
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ting. Child welfare is distributed more unequally when the assumption of equal distribution of
resources is relaxed.
Poverty results enable us to directly identify the percentage households with children below
the poverty line, but admitting the possibility that their parents are non-poor. Accounting for
family inequality is relevant in the poverty analysis. Poverty measures differ when using per
capita expenditures or per child sharing rule: child poverty is relatively higher when we consider
intra-household allocation of resources for both family structures, indicating that the traditional
indirect method may underestimate poverty rates.
5.1.1 Gender Preference in Expenditure
Our results show that in both types of families exists a gender bias in expenditure towards
children if they are females. This evidence is robust over time and significantly affects the
sharing rule. The proportion of total expenditure that is allocated to children when they are
girls is higher than in any other case regarding the gender composition of the household, and it
is independent of the level of total expenditure.33
In two-parent families, if children in the household are girls, then their per capita resource
share is between 10 (in 2004) and 14 (in 2012) percentage points higher than if the children
are all boys, while in single parent families, between 5 (in 1996) and 23 (in 2012) percentage
points. The difference between children and adults resource share is larger when children in the
households are females.
One possible explanation for this gender preference could be related to a gender investment
bias. If the proportion of families with only females is relatively older and more educated they
may value more human capital and invest more on their children education. We find that there is
a significant difference in the proportion of more educated parents: parents of only girls have a
higher level of education in both types of families. However, the magnitude of the differences in
the distribution of age and education level between parents of only females or parents with girls
and boys is not large. Regarding age, we find that parents of only girls are relatively younger in
the case of two parent families. Age and educational differences are not significant in 1996.
Additionally, in Argentina, the school attendance rate for girls is higher than for boys, and
the gender gap is increasing in the age of children (UNESCO, 2016). This could translate
into a higher education expenditure by parents of only girls. Public education in Argentina
is free, consequently expenditures are frequently zero or very low (confined to text books, extra-
curricular courses, for example), but many parents still prefer private schools (Gasparini and
Cruces, 2010), increasing the educational costs in their children. In single parent households
the average expenditure made by the head in education is higher when children are girls (ex-
cept in 1996, where the effect on the sharing rule is not significant). In two parent families with
33The bias in the expenditure towards girls, and its effect on the sharing rule, is conditional on the fact that children
in the household are girls. We do not find a robust effect when considering the proportion of females or the presence
of at least one girl. Furthermore, and according to the evidence established in the literature (e.g. Ejrnæs and Pörtner,
2004; Jayachandran and Pande, 2017), we also test in unreported estimations if the birth order of children matters
in the intra-household distribution of total expenditure, but it does not affect the sharing rule.
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only females, the average expenditure in education is not consistently higher (Table A.5 of the
Appendix A). One relevant difference is found in 2012, and it is driven by a higher education
expenditure in families with just one child. This may be associated with the increase in the shar-
ing rule coefficient for the distribution variable indicating the presence of only females children
for 2012 - the same is observed in single parent families. Thus, the gender bias observed in our
estimations for two parent and single parent households could be explained by an education
investment hypothesis, but only partially since it does not verify for both types of families.
Another argument may be related to a higher clothing expenditure for girls that becomes
significant when children are females. On average, parents of only girls spend a relatively similar
amount on clothing expenditure than parents of only boys or girls and boys, in each family size
and type of family (Table A.5 of the Appendix A). Thus, gender bias in our case seems not be
associated with clothing expenditure.
It is also possible that girls are more expenditure-consuming and demanding than boys.
Moreover, clothing for girls may be expensive than clothing for boys. There is evidence that in
Argentina many goods aimed at women (from backpacks, health care products to haircuts) are
on average 13.7% more expensive than those for men (CAME, 2018)34.
Additionally, the gender bias found could be indicative of a psychological effect, where par-
ents are more altruistic towards their children depending on their characteristics.
5.2 Children’s Resources and Female Labor Participation
In Argentina, between 1996 and 2012, female participation in the labor market grew from 37%
to 50%. Moreover, the relative importance of the mother’s income over total household labor
income increased by 40%. Given the magnitude of these changes, we analyze which is the re-
lationship between female labor participation and child well-being, and if mothers re-distribute
more income to children when they have enough bargaining power inside the household. We
assume that if mothers are income recipients, they have more bargaining power and, thus, can
influence how total expenditure is allocated within the household.35
Figure 2 shows that the share of expenditure that each child receives in the household is
higher when the mother is employed than when she is not, regardless of the level of household
total expenditure. Additionally, the per child sharing rule of children with working mothers is
quite constant over income quintiles.
We find a significant and robust effect over children’s sharing rule. Households with an
employed mother divert more resources to children than households where the mother is not
an income recipient, as measured by the coefficient related to the distribution factor indicating
34This has been called “pink tax”. However, we cannot test this hypothesis since we do not have price data
discriminating on child female and male clothing.
35Female labor participation may generate many intra-household effects: time allocation effects (e.g., both parents
working have less time to allocate to child care or domestic tasks), income effects (e.g., a working adult brings more
resources to the household), and a sharing rule effect (e.g., a working mother may have more bargaining power to
allocate income to her children). These effects may involve distribution impacts, as for example on the welfare of
children. Given our focus of interest and available data and we center on the sharing rule effect.
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if the mother is employed (Table 1). This situation has became more pronounced over time, as
did the changes in the female labor participation. The difference in the average sharing rule
of children living in households with an employed or unemployed mother has increased over
time: 59% and 56% in 1996, 52% and 47% in 2004, and 64% and 56% in 2012, respectively.
Even more, children with an employed mother receive not only a higher share of income but
are also better in absolute terms, since the amount of expenditure allocated to each of them is
substantially higher; 50% in 1996, 81% in 2004 and 65% in 2012.
Figure 2: Per Child Sharing Rule if the Mother is Employed or Unemployed
Note: expenditures are expressed in current pesos of each period.
Even tough the employment status of the mother is positive and significantly correlated with
her level of education, and household total income, we do not find an additional effect on the
sharing rule associated with education in any period. Working mothers allocate more household
resources to children, but there is no significant difference in the average per child sharing
rule if the employed mother has a low or high education level. On the contrary, we find an
heterogeneous and relevant effect regarding life cycle. In those households where the mother is
employed, per child sharing rule is above the average only if the mother is between 50 and 64
years old. This result is robust over time.
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6 Conclusions
We analyze intra-household distribution of resources in Argentina comparing how two parent
and, more fragile, single parent families assign their resources to children, and investigate their
determinants. Further, we seek to understand the role that working mothers play in the alloca-
tion process and to what extend they devote more economic resources to children as they are
more empowered. To address this, we estimate a collective model, which enables to identify
individuals’ resource shares (sharing rule), defined as the proportion of household resources
allocated to each household member. We use three consecutive expenditures surveys (1996,
2004 and 2012) in order to compare intra-household behavior of these two types of families
over three different socio-economic contexts.
We provide the first empirical evidence of intra-household inequality for Argentina and show
that the unitary model is rejected, since resources inside the family are not equally distributed
between adults and children. On average, intra-household distribution in Argentina is pro-child,
but two parent and single parent families assign their economic resources to children differently.
This allocation changes over time but in different directions according to the family structure.
Further, we observe that children living with single parents have a higher resource share than
children in two parent families, however they are relatively poorer. Thus, single parents devote
a higher proportion but of a much lower household expenditure to children than couples. If
public policies were to strengthen single parent families, in order to have higher income and
reverse their poverty situation, children could be specially better off and substantially improve
their well-being, and probably their outcomes.
We also identify characteristics of intra-household behavior that are persistent in time and
are shared by the two family structures, such us the positive gender bias in child expenditure
when children in the household are females, or the additional effect in favor of children if
parents are more educated. These results seem to reflect a pattern in behavior, which could be
relevant when designing public policies and understanding related phenomenons. Fox example,
if less educated parents are less willing to invest in their children it could lower the children’s
earning ability and capacity when they grow up, intensifying a inter-generational poverty trap.
Analyzing intra-household distribution of resources permits to better account for welfare
effects. We illustrate how inequality measures maybe underestimated when intra-household
inequality is not considered, and how the traditional definition of child poverty as the percentage
of families with children below the poverty line can be refined in favor of a direct measure of the
percentage of children below the poverty line. Intra-household inequality in resource allocation
could imply that poor children may reside with non-poor parents. This suggests that public
and international institutions should consider improving their poverty and inequality evaluation
techniques.
Additionally, we measure a female labor market effect on the sharing rule and document
that in two parent households where the mother works, more economic resources are devoted
to children, in comparison to households with non-working mothers. This effect is robust and
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larger over time. Female labor participation, and its increase over time, reflects a strengthened
bargaining position of the mother inside the household. However, during the last years there
has been a process of deceleration of the female labor participation, particularly documented
among more vulnerable, less educated and married women. This poses the question of what
could be the effect of this situation in the intra-household context, given that it has a direct
impact on child welfare.
Other direct policy implications arise: should cash transfer be given to mothers? Are cash
transfers directly increasing the amount of resources allocated to children? The impacts of
programs on child poverty strongly depend on the response of the household. We cannot assume
that cash transfers given to parents directly translate into child welfare. The collective setting,
and intra-household analysis, is of much importance in trying to disentangle theses questions,
and presents itself as a powerful framework shedding new lights on the effects of public policies
aimed at improving the welfare of household members. The intra-household evaluation of cash
transfer programs is the next step in our research agenda.
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A Appendix A: Tables
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics - Two Parent Families (1996 - 2004 - 2012)
Variables
1996 2004 2012
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Demographic Variables
1 if the household lives in Great Buenos Aires region 0.36 - 0.33 - 0.40 -
1 if the household lives in the Northern region 0.14 - 0.18 - 0.17 -
1 if the household lives in the Patagonia region 0.06 - 0.05 - 0.06 -
1 if owner a house 0.51 - 0.48 - 0.76 -
1 if owner of at least one car 0.43 - 0.38 - 0.48 -
1 if head has health insurance 0.66 - 0.63 - 0.72 -
1 if age of the head between 35 and 64 0.38 - 0.38 - 0.51 -
1 if the head has secondary educ. completed or not 0.41 - 0.44 - 0.51 -
1 if the head has universitary educ. completed or not 0.24 - 0.25 - 0.28 -
1 if age of the spouse between 35 and 64 0.23 - 0.24 - 0.37 -
1 if the spouse has secondary educ. completed or not 0.41 - 0.40 - 0.51 -
1 if the spouse has universitary educ. completed or not 0.29 - 0.32 - 0.31 -
1 if total household expenditure < total household income 0.60 - 0.53 - 0.58 -
Distribution Factors
1 if at least 1 child is >7 0.31 - 0.31 - 0.46 -
1 if children are females 0.32 - 0.33 - 0.33 -
relative price assignable adults/children 2.40 3.7 2.49 3.51 2.22 3.39
age of the father - age of the mother 2.91 4.69 3.27 4.97 3.08 5.65
years educ of the father - years educ of the mother -0.51 3.50 -0.74 3.64 -0.76 3.86
1 if the mother works 0.38 - 0.47 - 0.50 -
Shares of the Demand System
food and beverages 0.38 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.38 0.16
clothing and footwear 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.04
housing and maintenance 0.20 0.14 0.20 0.13 0.17 0.12
transport and communications 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.14
recreation and education 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09
health and other expenditures 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08
Number of obs. 3,783 3,633 3,862
Number of weighted obs. 1,031,705 1,479,933 2,043,241
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Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics - Single Parent Families (1996 - 2004 - 2012)
Variables
1996 2004 2012
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Demographic Variables
1 if the household lives in Great Buenos Aires region 0.33 - 0.33 - 0.39 -
1 if the household lives in the Northern region 0.16 - 0.19 - 0.18 -
1 if the household lives in the Patagonia region 0.08 - 0.08 - 0.08 -
1 if owner a house 0.44 - 0.46 - 0.69 -
1 if owner of at least one car 0.09 - 0.07 - 0.21 -
1 if head has health insurance 0.53 - 0.44 - 0.60 -
1 if age of the head between 35 and 64 0.36 - 0.39 - 0.57 -
1 if the head has secondary educ. completed or not 0.41 - 0.36 - 0.46 -
1 if the head has universitary educ. completed or not 0.28 - 0.31 - 0.30 -
1 if total household expenditure < total household income 0.52 - 0.42 - 0.41 -
Distribution Factors
1 if at least 1 child is >7 0.44 - 0.44 - 0.67 -
1 if children are females 0.35 - 0.37 - 0.34 -
relative price assignable adults/children 1.74 2.67 1.86 3.29 1.83 2.41
Shares of the Demand System
food and beverages 0.36 0.19 0.36 0.17 0.37 0.19
clothing and footwear 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.06
housing and maintenance 0.25 0.15 0.22 0.13 0.21 0.16
transport and communications 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12
recreation and education 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.13
health and other expenditures 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.08
Number of obs. 304 414 693
Number of weighted obs. 84,632 145,806 311,135
Table A.3: Pseudo Prices (1996 - 2004 - 2012)
System Categories
1996 2004 2012
Two Parents Single Parents Two Parents Single Parents Two Parents Single Parents
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
food and beverages 1.23 0.22 1.18 0.20 1.72 0.23 1.70 0.24 2.43 0.22 2.42 0.22
clothing and footwear -0.25 0.18 -0.23 0.20 0.24 0.19 0.26 0.19 0.98 0.19 1.0 0.18
housing and maint. 0.38 0.34 0.35 0.37 0.7 0.31 0.71 0.32 1.22 0.35 1.22 0.33
transport and comm. 0.05 0.28 0.06 0.31 0.35 0.32 0.35 0.32 0.99 0.30 0.99 0.30
recreation and educ. -0.22 0.36 -0.22 0.41 0.21 0.39 0.20 0.42 1.14 0.40 1.14 0.40
health and others 0.07 0.31 0.09 0.33 0.64 0.34 0.64 0.34 1.28 0.33 1.30 0.36
Note: pseudo prices are expressed in logarithms and are nominal values from prices of each period of time.
31
Table A.4: Truncation in Expenditure Shares - in Percentage (1996 - 2004 - 2012)
System Categories
1996 2004 2012
Two Parents Single Parents Two Parents Single Parents Two Parents Single Parents
food and beverages 0.1 0.6 0.5 2.4 0.7 1.6
clothing and footwear 0 0 0 0 0 0
housing and maint. 0.3 0.9 0.24 1.7 0.3 0.3
transport and comm. 17.3 27.6 14.6 20.5 6.7 14.3
recreation and educ. 15.9 23.0 19.2 25.4 11.0 13.41
health and other 9.5 23.0 7.5 16.7 8.8 14.6
Note: there are no zeros in clothing and footwear category because of the imputation made (see Appendix B).
Table A.5: Average Expenditures in Education and Clothing (1996 - 2004 - 2012)
Average Expenditure
1996 2004 2012
Two Parents Single Parents Two Parents Single Parents Two Parents Single Parents
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Education
only females
all families 31 71 18 46 35 83 39 76 115 283 299 713
families with 1 child 26 66 15 39 27 71 38 79 109 275 340 774
families with 2 or 3 children 37 79 25 57 50 102 43 66 125 294 124 305
females and males
all families 32 81 27 52 46 106 22 52 109 293 144 297
families with 1 child 25 72 29 51 27 61 30 59 77 227 111 268
families with 2 or 3 children 36 84 26 53 55 122 15 44 125 319 168 315
Clothing and Footwear
only females
all families 28 14 23 11 45 22 33 17 231 103 183 95
families with 1 child 27 13 24 10 43 21 32 17 227 105 176 96
families with 2 or 3 children 30 15 21 13 49 24 35 19 238 100 215 83
females and males
all families 29 14 21 14 47 24 30 16 236 104 194 87
families with 1 child 28 13 19 15 41 20 27 15 232 101 189 80
families with 2 or 3 children 30 14 23 13 51 26 32 16 238 106 197 91
Note: expenditures are expressed in current pesos of each period.
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Table A.6: First Stage OLS Regression of Total Expenditure Endogeneity - Two Parent Fami-
lies (1996 - 2004 - 2012)
Explanatory Variables 1996 2004 2012
1 if the household lives in Great Buenos Aires region 0.157*** (0.028) 0.071** (0.027) 0.062* (0.033)
1 if the household lives in the Northern region -0.031 (0.024) -0.077*** (0.023) -0.052* (0.027)
1 if the household lives in the Patagonia region 0.024 (0.026) -0.049* (0.026) -0.093*** (0.033)
1 if owner a house -0.018 (0.016) -0.038** (0.016) -0.138*** (0.022)
1 if owner of at least one car 0.096*** (0.020) 0.114*** (0.018) 0.145*** (0.025)
1 if head has health insurance 0.061*** (0.020) 0.082*** (0.020) 0.065*** (0.024)
1 if age of the head between 35 and 64 0.025 (0.021) -0.002 (0.021) -0.008 (0.023)
1 if the head has secondary educ. 0.029 (0.024) 0.025 (0.024) 0.009 (0.029)
1 if the head has universitary educ. 0.094** (0.043) 0.115*** (0.030) 0.058 (0.044)
1 if age of the spouse between 35 and 64 -0.005 (0.022) 0.015 (0.023) 0.058** (0.023)
1 if the spouse has secondary educ. 0.004 (0.024) 0.049* (0.027) 0.029 (0.027)
1 if the spouse has universitary educ. 0.065 (0.040) 0.122*** (0.034) 0.064* (0.038)
1 if total expenditure < total income -0.648*** (0.015) -0.692*** (0.016) -0.729*** (0.020)
1 if at least 1 child is >7 0.033* (0.017) 0.020 (0.016) -0.010 (0.021)
1 if children are females -0.019 (0.016) -0.017 (0.017) -0.026 (0.020)
relative price assignable adults/children -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003)
age of the father - age of the mother -0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002)
years educ of the father - years educ of the mother -0.003 (0.004) 0.001 (0.003) -0.002 (0.003)
1 if the mother works -0.006 (0.016) 0.020 (0.015) 0.019 (0.022)
price of food and beverages (log) 0.092* (0.050) 0.174*** (0.043) 0.216*** (0.057)
price of clothing and footwear (log) 0.400*** (0.073) 0.131** (0.056) 0.231*** (0.077)
price of housing and maintenance (log) -0.125*** (0.030) -0.036 (0.034) -0.129*** (0.035)
price of transport and comm (log) 0.010 (0.036) -0.027 (0.034) -0.089** (0.043)
price of recreation and education (log) -0.075** (0.034) 0.013 (0.035) 0.024 (0.044)
price of health and others (log) -0.059* (0.035) -0.109*** (0.035) -0.086** (0.039)
total household income (log) 0.734*** (0.036) 0.666*** (0.024) 0.632*** (0.027)
constant 1.885*** (0.198) 2.259*** (0.150) 2.953*** (0.209)
F-Statistic 344 340 193
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
F-Statistic: variable total household income (log) 414 684 539
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: Dependent variable is the log of total household expenditure. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
33
Table A.7: First Stage OLS Regression of Total Expenditure Endogeneity - Single Parent
Families (1996 - 2004 - 2012)
Explanatory Variables 1996 2004 2012
1 if the household lives in Great Buenos Aires region 0.168 (0.193) 0.072 (0.092) 0.246** (0.105)
1 if the household lives in the Northern region -0.015 (0.089) -0.134* (0.075) -0.154** (0.077)
1 if the household lives in the Patagonia region -0.050 (0.128) -0.109 (0.102) -0.196 (0.162)
1 if owner a house 0.021 (0.076) -0.025 (0.048) -0.075 (0.058)
1 if owner of at least one car 0.144 (0.135) 0.250*** (0.071) 0.252*** (0.083)
1 if head has health insurance 0.088 (0.087) 0.169*** (0.056) 0.103* (0.059)
1 if age of the head between 35 and 64 0.001 (0.081) 0.042 (0.054) -0.095 (0.072)
1 if the head has secondary educ. -0.036 (0.087) 0.047 (0.052) 0.062 (0.080)
1 if the head has universitary educ. 0.234** (0.114) 0.121* (0.067) 0.106 (0.088)
1 if total expenditure < total income -0.610*** (0.072) -0.760*** (0.041) -0.774*** (0.052)
1 if at least 1 child is >7 0.058 (0.064) -0.027 (0.053) 0.039 (0.052)
1 if children are females 0.037 (0.064) -0.038 (0.048) -0.051 (0.063)
relative price assignable adults/children 0.006 (0.011) 0.006 (0.005) -0.008 (0.007)
price of food and beverages (log) 0.200 (0.195) 0.129 (0.129) 0.175 (0.166)
price of clothing and footwear (log) 0.296 (0.290) 0.302 (0.198) 0.639*** (0.215)
price of housing and maintenance (log) -0.204 (0.162) -0.103 (0.099) -0.083 (0.117)
price of transport and comm (log) -0.016 (0.179) 0.197* (0.117) -0.173 (0.162)
price of recreation and education (log) 0.098 (0.127) 0.038 (0.106) -0.142 (0.110)
price of health and others (log) -0.225 (0.195) -0.091 (0.115) -0.045 (0.144)
total household income (log) 0.619*** (0.131) 0.508*** (0.058) 0.605*** (0.053)
constant 2.332*** (0.791) 3.215*** (0.360) 2.947*** (0.456)
F-Statistic 43 76 38
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
F-Statistic: variable total household income (log) 22 96 127
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: Dependent variable is the log of total household expenditure. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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B Appendix B: Data Preparation
B.1 Pseudo Prices
Our expenditure data does not record information on prices. We compute household specific
pseudo unit values according to the theoretical method developed by Lewbel (1989), and ap-
plied in Atella et al. (2004), Hoderlein and Mihaleva (2008), and Menon et al. (2017). The
technique captures the spatial and quality variability typical of unit values from household so-
cioeconomic characteristics, using the variability of the budget shares at a high disaggregation
level.
We first reproduce the distribution of the unit price variation and, then, we add this variabil-
ity to the price indexes published monthly and construct nominal unit values. The demographi-
cal variability added to the price indexes can be thought as a way of exogenize prices.36
Pseudo unit values expressed in levels are constructed in the following way37
pˆi =
1
ki
∏ni
j=1w
−wij
ij Pmi yi
where i is a good category of the demand system, and j are the sub-category goods within
group i, ki is the average of the subgroup expenditure for the i−th group budget share, wij is the
sub-category budget share, and yi is the average expenditure of group i. Pmi is a group-specific
price index given by Pmi =
∑ni
j=1 Pmijwij , being Pmij the price indexes published monthly by
the statistic institute. Descriptive statistics for the estimated pseudo prices for each survey are
presented in Table A.3 of Appendix A.
B.2 Infrequency of Purchases
Cross-section household expenditure data often involve zero purchases. The percentage of zero
expenditure in each of the system categories in our data is reported in Table A.4 of Appendix
A. Transportation and communications, recreation and education, and health and others, are
censored in a non-negligible size, creating a selectivity problem in our data.
This entails both an econometric potential problem and an economic interpretation. The
censoring may be due to infrequency of purchase related to the relatively short duration of
the recall period of the survey design (see Section 4.1), because of consumer’s preferences or
because household deliberately decide not to consume particular goods given the prices and
income constrains (Pudney, 1989).
If non correction is made, we would obtain biased and inconsistent coefficients. If only
observed positive purchase data are used, coefficient estimates would be inconsistent. In order
36If prices were not included in the analysis, assuming that all families pay the same prices for homogeneous
goods, we would be able to estimate Engel curves. Without accounting for price effects, we cannot implement
detailed behavioral and welfare applications.
37These prices are based on two main assumptions: an original function homothetically separable and Cobb-
Douglas within group sub-utility functions.
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to address this econometric problem, we use a generalization of Heckman’s two-steps estimator
(1979), presented by Shonkwiller and Yen (1999). They propose a consistent estimator, in a
two-stage decision process, for a censored system of equations that overcomes the issues which
emerge in Amemiya (1978, 1979) and Heien and Wessells (1990).
The Shonkwiller and Yen (1999) approach is general enough to be well suited for a large
source of zero expenditures and it is consistent with a two-step estimation procedure. In the first
step we estimate the consumption probability of each household with a Probit model for each
category and obtain the standard normal distribution density and cumulative function. In the
second step, the demand system is augmented by the predicted estimated normal cumulative
function, and the density function is added as an explanatory variable.
Consider the following general limited dependent variable system of i = 1, 2, ..., M equa-
tions,
x∗i = x (g, θi) + εi , h
∗
i = s
′
iτi + vi ,
hi =
1 if h∗i > 00 if h∗i ≤ 0 ,
xi = hi x
∗
i
(12)
where x(gi, θi) represents the observed collective QUAIDS shares, hi are the indicator vari-
ables, x∗i and h
∗
i are the latent variables, gi and si are vectors of exogenous variables, θi and τi
are parameters, and, εi and υi are random errors. In our application, xi is replaced by wi, and
x(gi, θi) by the right hand side of the equations of the demand system.
The equations of system in (12) can be summarized as
xi = Ψ(s
′
iτi) x (gi, θi) + ηiψ(s
′
iτi) + ξi
where Ψ and ψ are univariate normal standard cumulative distribution and probability den-
sity functions respectively. The element ξi = xi−E [xi|gi] belongs to the vector ξ vMVN(0; Ω).
The set of parameters τi is estimated using a Maximum Likelihood Probit estimator to obtain
Ψ(s′iτi) and ψ(s
′
iτi). The vector of regressors related to the purchase decisions of the first-stage
includes the age of the household head and educational level, total household income and its
square, the number of children in the household and regional dummies, household total income,
squared of income, household size and an interaction between members and income.38
B.3 Censuring of Clothing Expenditures
Our approach and application exploits the observability of assignable goods. This is crucial
information to construct individual total expenditures. Clothing and footwear, for adults and
38The results of the first stage regressions of the correction of infrequency of purchases (Probit equations) are
available upon request.
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children, are particularly important because they are the largest components of the assignable
expenditure available. However, many observations report zero expenditures.39
Blundell and Meghir (1987) propose a bivariate model as an alternative to the classic univari-
ate Tobit model for censured data. As the authors explain, in the case of clothing, the adequate
model is described by a process of infrequency of purchases for semi-durable commodities with-
out corner solutions. Purchase infrequency results in expenditures over the period under survey
that may not reflect actual consumption. Since the recall period is too short (one month), zero
expenditures are commonly observed. However, it is unlikely that those zeros represent a cor-
ner solution, since it is unlikely that people do not buy clothes given it is a necessity commodity.
Clothing may not be purchased in the reference period of the survey because they give utility
for more than one period, and a household may need to buy them only a few times in a year.
Additionally, the recall period may also cause measurement errors.
Following Blundell and Meghir (1987), the relationship between the observation of the de-
pendent variable yi, and its correspondent latent value y∗i can be written as Pi yi = y
∗
i + vi =
(xiβ + ei) + vi, where Pi is the probability of purchase. The censoring rule is given by yi =
(y*i + vi)Pi if Di > 0 and yi = 0 otherwise, where Di is a latent variable describing the decision
to purchase (i.e., Di > 0 if and only if yi > 0). The log-likelihood function proposed by the
authors is given by
log L =
∑
+
[
1
σe
ϕ
(
Φ(riα) yi−xiβ
σe
)
Φ(riα)
2
]
+
∑
0 [1− Φ(riα)]
where
∑
+ and
∑
0 refer to summation over positive and zero observations for the observed
expenditure yi and Φ(.) and ϕ(.) refer to the standard normal cumulative and density functions,
respectively. Consistent starting values for the parameters α can be obtained by a Probit or OLS
estimation among purchases and non-purchases, while for β by applying a Tobit model to the
equation yi = xiβ + ei, over the entire sample, that is, including the zero values of yi. The
bivariate Tobit is done separately for clothing for adults and clothing for children.
B.4 Endogeneity of Total Expenditure
The estimation of demand systems generally require a correction for potential endogeneity if
total expenditure is correlated with the residuals of the demand system equations.40 The resid-
uals in the demand system equations can be interpreted as the household’s unobserved tastes
or preferences that affect each budget share. Total expenditure could be endogenous if taste
shocks that determine total expenditure are correlated with the unobserved taste shocks to a
particular component in the system, or if measurement (or recall) errors in the budget shares
39Notice that if a household reports zero expenditure in clothing for adults and/or children, and if the other
minor components of the assignable information are as well zero, we would not be able to observe any assignable
information and construct individual total expenditures. Thus, if no censoring correction is made, we would need to
drop those observations, loosing valuable information.
40Total expenditure is uncorrelated with the residuals of the demand equations only when severe restrictions are
satisfied (LaFrance, 1991).
40
are correlated with measurement (or recall) errors in total expenditure.
A valid instrument should provide a source of exogenous variation explaining the cross-
sectional variability of total expenditure but without being correlated with taste variables and
measurement errors. We choose total household income, as in, for example, Cherchye et al.
(2012), and Tommasi (2018), as an instrument of total expenditure, assuming that recall errors
in household total expenditure are not correlated with measured household income, which is
a commonly accepted assumption.41 We also require that income do not affect spending pat-
terns.42
To address the endogeneity problem, we use the control function approach proposed origi-
nally by Blundell and Powell (2004), since in non-linear models the use of the first stage pre-
diction in place of the endogenous variable is biased and inconsistent (Terza et al., 2008). The
approach consists in a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, we estimate an OLS regression of
the endogenous variable on all covariates of the demand system and the instruments and, in the
second stage, we estimate an augmented system adding the predicted residuals from the first
stage. Thus, in each equation of the demand system, an extra regressor is included to control for
endogenous total expenditures Defining s as the vector of all covariates of the main regression
(prices, demographic variables and distribution factors) and the instruments, the first stage re-
gression is given by ln y = spi+ω, where ω is a spherical error term, with E[s′ω] = 0 and whose
prediction is ωˆ = ln y − spˆi, is used in the demand system as specified in the next section.
The key behind the control function approach is that, conditioning on observables, the only
source of dependence is given by the relation between the residuals of the total expenditure,
ω, and the residuals of the share equations, ε. Then, the procedure permits to recover some
function of ω, via its relationship with the model observables, and condition on it in the main
equation of interest solving the endogeneity problem. The control function approach has several
advantages, including that it gives a straightforward test for endogeneity, by testing the signifi-
cance of the coefficients of the estimated residuals (first stage) in the system equations (second
stage). A statistically different from zero parameter means the unexplained variation of the en-
dogenous variable also affects the variations in demand, implying endogeneity of the variable.
In Tables A.6 and A.7 of Appendix A we report the OLS regression of the first stage. The partial
F-statistic on our instrument is high, indicating that the instrument is a good predictor of total
expenditure.
41We also explore an endogeneity correction using a wealth index as an instrument (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001;
World Bank, 2003; Houweling et al., 2003). Total income is a stronger instrument in our setting, although our
parameters of interest and main results are robust to the endogeneity correction. Results are available upon request.
42If consumption and leisure are not separable in the utility function, income is not valid instrument for total
expenditure. However, as noticed by Attanasio and Lechene (2014), if this happen the entire demand system would
be is misspecified, given that the amount of hours of work should enter as a determinant of the demand system,
allowing for the effect of hours of work on the marginal utility of consumption.
41
